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Abstract
In market modeling, one often treats buyers as a homogeneous group. In this paper we consider buyers with heterogeneous
preferences and products available in many variants. Such a framework allows us to successfully model various market phenomena.
In particular, we investigate how is the vendor’s behavior inﬂuenced by the amount of available information and by the presence of
correlations in the system.
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1. Introduction
The standard economics textbooks make the supply–demand law as one of the pillars of the modern economic
theory. However, many people, especially economists (see for example Ref. [1]), gradually realize that the most
important factor is missing in the traditional supply–demand law. The study of complex systems [2–4] has already
led to novel approaches to market phenomena. In a previous work [5], one of us introduced a simple framework to
treat both quality and information capability, yielding a generalized supply–demand law. However, in the previous
paper, a product is simply characterized by a single scalar variable: quality. In the modern economy we face a much
more complex world, where the products have many attributes and consumers have heterogeneous tastes [6]. These
preferences cannot be simply represented as price and quality alone. We therefore generalize the previous work to
allow multiple variants of each product as well as many different tastes among consumers.
Thus the producers face a dilemma: whether to target the average taste by producing a single or a few variants to
leverage the economy of scale, or to match precisely each consumer’s taste [7]. We shall see that the answer depends
on the information level that the producers may access: whether they know, and how well they know the consumers’
preferences. In addition, producers face also the nonlinear production costs. All the factors have to compromise
to yield a combined result that gives various degrees of product diversity. With our approach, the supply–demand
problem of producers with the capability of producing variations and consumers’ diverse tastes becomes a matching
problem [8,9], where many mathematical and statistical mechanic tools are available to handle the complexity of the
combinatorial problem.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 26 300 9139; fax: +41 26 300 9758.
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In this paper we build a market model and investigate its behavior under various circumstances. In the ﬁrst part of
the paper we do not consider correlations between preferences of the parties included in the system. While unrealistic,
this assumption allows us to discover the basic properties of the model and outline the way of reasoning which can
be used also in later, more realistic considerations. In the second part of the paper we discuss the correlations and
the ways how they can be introduced to the system. The last part of the paper deals with the consequences of the
correlations for the model.
2. General framework: One vendor with many buyers
Let us start with a market where only one vendor and M buyers are present. The vendor can produce N different
variants of a product (e.g. many different shoes). With regard to the market, he has to decide which variants it is
optimal to produce. We assume that all buyers satisﬁed with the offer by one item, others stay out of the trading.
Buyers in the market we label with lowercase Latin letters (i = 1, . . . , M). The different variants the vendor can
produce we label with Greek letters (α = 1, . . . , N ). The price of variant α we label as Pα . We assume that every
variant can be produced in as many pieces as it is needed and as fast as it is needed.
The simple structure sketched above offers us enough space to model the basic features of real markets. To establish
a mathematical model for the market we have to introduce some assumptions about participants’ preferences and their
consequences on the trading process. To keep complexity of the model at a minimum we assume that the buyer’s
opinion about a variant can be represented by one scalar quantity, which we call cost and label it with x ; we assume
that x ∈ [0; 1]. The smaller is the cost xi,α , the bigger is the probability that the buyer i is satisﬁed with variant α
when asked. Preferences of the vendor are easier to introduce; they are represented by costs which he suffers during
production and sale of a particular variant. The cost for variant α we label yα and after a proper rescaling of monetary
units yα ∈ [0; 1]. To simplify our considerations, we arrange the variants in the order of cost: y1 < y2 < · · · < yN .
We stress a conceptual difference between vendor’s and buyer’s costs. The seller’s cost yα is strictly monetary—it
represents a real amount of money (although in arbitrary units). In contrast, the buyer’s cost xi,α has no tangible
interpretation, it simply represents something as airy as happiness with the given variant.
The vendor is able to produce N different variants. However, when he is producing more variants, his expenses
grow due to the need of an additional investment. The vendor’s tendency to produce only few different variants can be
modeled e.g. by a nonlinear of expenses (doubling production of one single variant does not require double expenses).
We adopt another approach; we assume that to initiate the production of a variant, the vendor has to pay an additional
charge Z > 0 which is refered to as initial cost.
Now let us assume that the vendor offered k most favorable variants (thus α = 1, . . . , k, k ≤ N ) to customers and
the number of units sold of variant α is nα . The total vendor’s proﬁt is
X (k, {nα}) =
k∑
α=1
nα(Pα − yα) − kZ . (1)
Here the last term kZ comes for the initial costs of k produced variants, Pα − yα is the proﬁt for one sold unit of
variant α. Due to the monetary rescaling used to conﬁne yα to the range [0; 1], units for proﬁt, initial costs and prices
are arbitrary.
It is natural to assume that when buyer i is asked about interest to buy variant α, the decision is based on the cost
xi,α . We formalize this by the assumption that the probability of acceptance is a function of the variant cost; we call
this function acceptance function. Obviously, f (x) is a decreasing function of the cost x . Moreover, we assume that
f (0) = 1. This means that if a buyer considers a variant to be the perfect one, she surely buys it.
When we offer a random variant to one buyer, the acceptance probability is
∫ 1
0
π(x) f (x)dx ≡ p. (2)
Here π(x) is the probability distribution of cost x (i.e. it deﬁnes what “to offer a random variant” really means). The
probability p of accepting a random proposal is an important parameter of the model. From our everyday life we know
that largely we do not agree to such an offer. For this reason we assume that p  1 in our calculations.
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Fig. 1. One particularly simple choice for the buyers’ acceptance function f (x).
One example of a reasonable choice for the acceptance function is (see Fig. 1)
f (x; p) =
{
1 − x/2p (0 ≤ x ≤ 2p),
0 (2p < x)
(3)
with p < 0.5. This choice is especially convenient due to its simplicity. If we now assume that uniform distribution
of the buyer’s costs, π(x) = 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, parameter p of the acceptance function (3) is just the probability p of
accepting a random offer introduced in the previous paragraph.
In the rest of this paper we assume that the prices of all variants are equal to 1, Pα = 1. This relieves us from many
technicalities, and helps us to highlight the important features of the model. Nevertheless, generalization to various
prices is straightforward.
3. No correlations in costs
We begin our investigation with the simplest case of the presented model—the market without correlations, where
all costs yα and xi,α are mutually independent. We model this by costs uniformly distributed in the range [0; 1]. To
keep the variants ordered, we ﬁrst draw their costs and then we renumber all variants achieve y1 < y2 < · · · < yN . It
follows that after averaging over realizations, the formula 〈yα〉 = α/(N + 1) holds.
3.1. A vendor without knowledge of buyers’ preferences
If a vendor wants to discover which variants are most acceptable for buyers, in a market without correlations each
buyer has to be asked for preferences. This cannot be done in big markets, thus it is natural to investigate the case with
no information about buyers’ preferences on the vendor’s side. In Section 3.4 we show that without correlations even
an expensive global opinion survey brings only a negligible contribution to the vendor’s income.
Without any information about preferences, the vendor is not able to discover which variants are most favored by
buyers. Therefore the best strategy is to offer the variants that are most favorable from his point of view. Let us label
the number of variants the vendor is willing to offer as k. We assume that all these variants are available to buyers
simultaneously, similarly to different types of shoes available in a shoe shop. Every buyer goes through the offered
variants and decides whether some of them are suitable or not.
From the buyer’s point of view, the vendor makes random proposals; the probability of accepting one particular
offer is thus by deﬁnition equal to p. The probability PA that one particular buyer accepts one of the k proposed
variants is complementary to the probability (1 − p)k of denying all offered variants. Thus we have
PA = 1 − (1 − p)k ≈ 1 − e−pk, (4)
where the approximation used is valid for pk  1, i.e. for very choosy consumers (then p is a small quantity) and
a small number of offered variants. Now the average number of items sold by the vendor to all M buyers is MPA.
Since no correlations are present, the average number of items sold of variant α is 〈nα〉 = MPA/k, it is a decreasing
function of k.
The quantity of vendor’s interest is the total proﬁt X introduced in (1). Its expected value can be found using 〈nα〉,
〈yα〉, and PA. We obtain
XU (k) = M
(
1 − e−pk
)(
1 − 1 + k
2(N + 1)
)
− kZ . (5)
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Fig. 2. Expected proﬁt of the uninformed vendor, XU (k), drawn against k for small initial costs (solid line), medium initial costs (dashed line) and
high initial costs (dotted line). In the last case, the condition Z > Mp is fulﬁlled and the optimal vendor’s strategy is to stop the production.
Fig. 3. The optimal number of offered variants and the optimal proﬁt as functions of the initial cost Z for M = 500, N = 2 000, and p = 0.05.
Numerical results (empty circles) are averages over 1 000 realizations, analytical results (solid lines) come from Eq. (6). For the optimal proﬁt
arbitrary units are used.
Here the subscript U reminds that we are dealing with an “uninformed” vendor. This function is sketched in Fig. 2
for three different choices of the initial cost Z . The optimal number of variants the vendor should offer maximizes his
proﬁt. One can easily show that when X ′U (0) < 0, XU (k) < 0 for all k > 0. Thus the condition X ′U (0) < 0, which
can be rewritten as Z > Mp, characterizes a market where the optimal vendor’s strategy is to stop the production and
stay idle.
Since for every product numerous variations can be made, the total number of variants the vendor can offer, N , is
large. Thus we are allowed to assume that the optimal number of offered variants satisﬁes the condition kopt  N and
solve the maximization condition X ′U (k) = 0 approximately. We obtain
kopt = 1p ln
Mp
Z
, Xopt = M − Zp
(
1 + ln Mp
Z
)
, (6)
where Xopt is the optimal expected proﬁt, Xopt = XU (kopt). The used approximations are valid when Z  M/N and
p  1. In Fig. 3, these results are shown to match a numerical treatment of the problem. In the ﬁgure we see how the
initial cost Z inﬂuences diversity of the vendor’s production: decreasing Z increases differentiation of the vendor’s
supply in full agreement with expectations. We can examine this feature in detail if we plot the optimal number of
offered variants against Z for one particular realization of the model as it is shown in Fig. 4 (thickness of the lines is
proportional to the number of buyers of a variant).
3.2. Improvement of the vendor’s proﬁt by a sequential offering of variants
So far we dealt with a very passive approach of the vendor. While offering k variants to the market, he had no
inﬂuence on the sale. In consequence, due to the absence of correlations in the system, every offered variant had the
same average number of items sold. In a big market this is a natural approach. (While the use of advertising can
promote some variants, its treatment exceeds our scope.)
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Fig. 4. Differentiation of the vendor’s production for various initial costs Z : single realization of the model (no averaging present) with M = 500,
N = 2000, p = 0.05. Vertical axis has no signiﬁcant meaning, it serves purely to distinguish different variants.
In a small market a personal offering is possible. The vendor can promote favorable variants to increase the proﬁt
simply by offering the most favorable variant ﬁrst. If a buyer is not interested, the second most favorable variant
follows, etc. The average sale of the ﬁrst variant is 〈n′1〉 = Mp, for the second variant it is 〈n′2〉 = M(1 − p)p and in
general we have 〈n′α〉 = Mp(1 − p)α−1. Hence the expected total sale is
k∑
i=1
Mp(1 − p)i−1 = M
[
1 − (1 − p)k
]
.
This is equal to the expected total sale MPA of the uninformed vendor in the previous section. We can conclude that
the vendor’s proﬁt improvement (if any) does not come from an increased total sale but rather from an increased sale
of the variants that are more proﬁtable for the vendor.
Now we investigate the optimal number of variants to offer in this case, k′opt. Since 〈n′α〉 decreases with α, at some
moment it is not proﬁtable to offer one more variant and the vendor’s proﬁt is maximized. The corresponding equation
〈n′α〉 = 〈n′α〉〈yα〉 + Z can be solved with respect to α, leading to k′opt. When the total number of possible variants N
is big, 〈yα〉  1 and the term 〈n′α〉〈yα〉 can be neglected. The approximate solution is then
k′opt ≈
ln(Z/Mp)
ln(1 − p) . (7)
This optimal number of variants to offer is smaller than kopt given by Eq. (6). We can also notice that when p is
small, using the approximation ln(1 − p) ≈ −p we are left with k′opt ≈ kopt. This is an intriguing property—by the
two different approaches we obtained the same result. To compare k′opt in markets with different sizes, we plot it as a
function of Z/M in Fig. 5. As can be seen, in a big market (M  100 000) Eq. (7) ﬁts well a numerical simulation of
the system.
One can examine also the increase of the vendor’s proﬁt caused by the change of the sale method. Using previous
results, the approximate formula ΔXopt ≈ Z [1 + ln(Mp/Z)]/(Np2) can be obtained. We see that when the total
number of variants N is big, sequential offering results in a small growth of the vendor’s proﬁt. Nevertheless, in a
system with a limited offer (small N ) or with very choosy buyers (very small p), the improvement can be substantial.
We should notice that the stopping condition “income greater than expenses” introduced above can be hard to use
in practice. It is because n′α is a random quantity and can drop to the disadvantageous region n′α < Z + n′α yα even
when 〈n′α〉 is big enough to cover the expenses. Thus for the vendor it is not enough to simply check proﬁtability of
the sale of one particular variant n′α . Rather he has to take into account sales of all previously offered variants. This is
especially important in systems with a small number of buyers M where relative ﬂuctuations are bigger. This effect
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Fig. 5. Successive offering: numerical and analytical results for the vendor using stopping condition described in the text in the markets with various
sizes (on horizontal axis we have q ≡ Z/M). All numerical results are obtained as average of 10 000 realizations with p = 0.05, N = 2000; solid
line represents Eq. (7).
is shown in Fig. 5 where numerical results for the vendor blindly using the stopping condition are shown for various
market sizes. Clearly as M increases, numerical results approach the analytical result (7).
3.3. Competition of two vendors
In real markets we seldom ﬁnd a monopolist vendor; competition and partition of the market is a natural
phenomenon. To investigate the model behavior in such a case we introduce the second vendor to the market. We
assume that the vendors differ by initial costs which are Z1 and Z2 respectively. Again we do not consider the inﬂuence
of advertisements and reputation, albeit they are vital in a market competition.
The course of the solution is similar to the one leading to Eq. (5). We label the number of variants offered by vendor
1 as k1, the number of variants offered by vendor 2 as k2, and we assume that there is no overlap between offered
variants. The aggregate sale of two buyers is MP ′A where
P ′A = 1 − (1 − p)k1+k2 ≈ 1 − exp[−p(k1 + k2)].
With our assumptions about the equal status of the vendors, every offered variant has the same average sale. Therefore
both vendors gain the share proportional to the number of variants they offer. Thus vendor 1 takes k1/(k1 + k2) of the
total sale and vice versa. When k1/N , k2/N  1, we can simplify the expected proﬁts to the form
X1(k1, k2) = M
(
1 − e−p(k1+k2)
) k1
k1 + k2 − k1Z1, (8a)
X2(k1, k2) = M
(
1 − e−p(k1+k2)
) k2
k1 + k2 − k2Z2. (8b)
Both parties maximize their proﬁts by adjusting k1 and k2. The corresponding system ∂k1 X1(k1, k2) =
0, ∂k2 X2(k1, k2) = 0 cannot be solved analytically but its numerical treatment is straightforward. The result is shown
in Fig. 6 where we have ﬁxed the initial cost Z2 to investigate how kopt and Xopt for both vendors vary with Z1.
We see that at Z1 ≈ 12 vendor 1 stops the production for he cannot stand the competition of vendor 2. By putting
k2 = 0 in the equations ∂k1 X1(k1, k2) = 0 and ∂k2 X2(k1, k2) = 0 we obtain the expression for the value Z∗1 when this
price-out occurs
Z∗1 =
Mp
ln(Mp/Z2)
(
1 − Z2
Mp
)
. (9)
It is in a good agreement with the values found by a numerical simulation of the model. Important feature of this result
is that it depends on the initial price Z2 of the competitive vendor—decreasing the production costs can expel others
from the market.
One can notice that when vendor 1 tries to increase the proﬁt by deliberately increasing k1 (with the intention to
increase the sale), the term −k1Z1 prevents the success of this strategy. As a result, the vendors have to adapt to each
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Fig. 6. The optimal number of variants to offer (left) and the optimal proﬁt (right) for vendor 1 (solid line) and for vendor 2 (dashed line) against
Z1. The initial cost of the second vendor is Z2 = 5.0, M = 500, and p = 0.05.
other. In mathematical terms, X1(k1opt, k2opt) ≥ X1(k1, k2opt). At the same time, the sum of proﬁts is not maximized
at k1opt and k2opt. It is more proﬁtable to remove the less efﬁcient producer (the one with the higher value of initial
costs). This is an analogy of a real market where ruining (or taking over) of a competitor can improve the company
proﬁt.
3.4. An informed vendor
Now we would like to investigate the artiﬁcial case of the market where the vendor knows costs xi,α of all buyers.
This knowledge can be used to increase the optimal proﬁt. We start with a simpler question: if the vendor offers
only one variant, how much the sale can be increased by a good choice of the variant? The probability that buyer i
is agreeable to buy variant α is f (xi,α). Since costs xi,α are random and independent, only the average acceptance
probability p plays a role and the number of users willing to buy this variant, nα , is thus binomially distributed with
the mean 〈nα〉 = Mp and the variance σ 2 = Mp(1 − p). When the number of buyers M is big, we can pass to a
continuous approximation and assume the normal distribution of nα
f (nα) ≈ 1√
2πσ
exp
[
− (nα − Mp)
2
2σ 2
]
. (10)
The biggest value from the set {nα} (α = 1, . . . , N ) we label as m. This is the number of potential buyers for the most
accepted variant and the vendor does the best when by offering this variant. The probability density fN (m) (often
called extremal distribution) is
fN (m) = N√
2πσ
exp
[
− (m − Mp)
2
2σ 2
](
1
2
+ 1
2
Erf
[
m − Mp
σ
√
2
])N−1
. (11)
The multiplication by N appears because we do not care which one of all N variants is “the most accepted” one and
the error function term represents the probability that the remaining N − 1 variants are less accepted.
Since we are interested in big values of N , we expect that the difference 〈m〉 − M is big in comparison with σ .
Therefore we use the approximation Erf(x) ≈ 1−exp[−x2]/√πx2, which is valid for x  1. When the error function
value is close to one, we can also use the approximation (1 − x)N ≈ exp[−Nx] (x  1) to obtain
fN (m) ≈ N√
2πσ
exp
[
− (m − Mp)
2
2σ 2
− σ N√
2π
exp
[−(m − Mp)2/2σ 2]
m − Mp
]
.
This form is too complicated to obtain an analytical result for 〈m〉. Instead we compute the most probable value m˜
m˜ ≈ Mp + σ
√
2 ln
σ 3N√
2π
.
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Fig. 7. The relative growth of the vendor’s sale δ is drawn against the total number of buyers M . Solid lines represent the analytical result, outcomes
from numerical simulations are shown as symbols.
Here the ﬁrst term Mp represents the average value of the sale and the additional term represents the gain arising from
the additional vendor’s knowledge. To get a better notion about the sale growth we use the relative sale growth
δ ≡ m˜ − Mp
Mp
≈
√
1
Mp
ln
pMN 2
2π
. (12)
To simplify the formula, the assumption p  1 has been used. A comparison of this result with a numerical simulation
of the model is shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen, a good agreement is obtained.
When δ  1, all vendor’s information is indeed useless and the average sale improvement is negligible. The
inequality δ  1 leads to the condition
N 2  2π
Mp
eMp. (13)
Thus when the number of variants is not large enough, buyers’ opinions in the uncorrelated market cannot be used to
increase the vendor’s sale and proﬁt.
From the previous results we can draw useful implications about the vendor with perfect information, offering
more than only one variant. When the total number of variants N is big, the number of variants offered by the vendor
is small in comparison with N . Therefore the average sale of all offered variants is increased at most by δ given by Eq.
(12) and the same applies to the total sale. However, the vendor is interested mainly in his proﬁt. When we take into
account different costs yα of variants, the resulting growth of the income due to the informations is even smaller than
δ because the variant with the highest sale can have a high cost for the vendor. Thus condition (13) has more general
consequences. It speciﬁes the circumstances when even the perfect information about buyers’ preferences do not help
the vendor to achieve a signiﬁcant improvement of his proﬁt.
4. Correlations in the system
Now we would like to add one important ﬂavor to the model—correlations. They arise from conformity of people’s
tastes (buyer–buyer correlations) and from the fact that high quality preferred by buyers results in high costs on the
vendor’s side (buyer–vendor anticorrelations). To approach the behavior of a real market, we investigate how these
correlations inﬂuence our results obtained so far. Before doing so, we brieﬂy discuss correlations from a general point
of view.
4.1. Measures of correlations
Correlation is the degree to which two or more quantities are associated. We shall discuss different ways how
to measure the correlations and how to introduce them to the system. In particular, we would like to measure the
correlation between two lists (vectors) of costs: xi and x j (two buyers) or xi and y (a buyer and the vendor). All lists
of our interest have length N and contain real numbers between 0 and 1. A common choice for the correlation measure
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is Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient r . For lists x and y it is deﬁned as
r2 =
[
N∑
α=1
(xα − x)(yα − y)
]2
N∑
α=1
(xα − x)2
N∑
α=1
(yα − y)2
. (14)
This measure is sensitive to nonlinear transformations of values in lists x and y. In addition, since it originates in the
least-square ﬁtting of the data by a straight line, it measures only a linear correlation. For this reasons, in this work we
use another correlation measure, Kendall’s tau. For lists x and y it is given by the formula
τ = 2
N (N − 1)
∑
α<β
σαβ, σαβ = sgn [(xα − xβ)(yα − yβ)] (15)
and it ranges from +1 (exactly the same ordering of lists x and y) to −1 (reverse ordering of lists); uncorrelated lists
have τ = 0. Notably, Kendall’s tau is insensitive to all monotonic mappings of the data. This is the strongest property
we can expect from a correlation measure—more general transformations, nonmonotonic mappings, can sweep out
any structure present in the data.
4.2. Lists with a given correlation degree
Now we would like to construct a set of lists that have mutual values of Kendall’s tau equal to τ0. Such a set would
represent lists of buyers’ preferences in an equally dispersed society. Since the buyers’ tastes are to a certain extent
similar, we expect positive correlations with τ0 > 0. Nevertheless, in the following discussion we do not conﬁne
ourself to this region.
First we address a different question. Let us assume that between lists 1 and 2 there is τ12, between lists 1 and 3
there is τ13. Does it imply any constraints on τ23? The answer is yes. It can be shown (see Appendix B) that τ23 fulﬁlls
the inequality
|τ12 + τ13| − 1 ≤ τ23 ≤ 1 − |τ12 − τ13|, (16)
which is an analogy of the triangular inequality for side lengths of a triangle. From (16) we can draw various
simple conclusions. First, if we want to construct three lists which have pairwisely τ0, it is possible only for
−1/3 ≤ τ0 ≤ 1.1 Thus it is impossible to have more than two lists which are perfectly anticorrelated. Another
simple result is that when τ12 = −1, inevitably τ23 = −τ13.
Now the question is whether we are able to create the whole system of M lists which all have pairwisely Kendall’s
tau equal to τ0. The answer depends on the magnitude of M . It can be shown (see Appendix B) that the upper bound
for M is
Mm =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2 + log2
(1 − τ0)(N − 1)N
4
(τ0 ≥ 0),
min
[
2 + log2
(1 − τ0)(N − 1)N
4
, 2 log2
1 − τ0
−τ0
]
(τ0 < 0).
(17)
As can be seen in Fig. 8, this quantity grows slowly with the list length N . Therefore to model a market with a large
number of equally correlated buyers we would need an enormous number of possible variants.
4.3. Generation of correlated lists
In the previous paragraphs we found that the society with a ﬁxed mutual correlation degree of buyers is limited
in its size. Therefore to introduce correlations to the presented market model we need a different approach. While
copulas represent a general tool (see e.g. [10,11]), they are useful mainly for numerical simulations and offer only
small possibilities for analytical results. Here we adopt a simpler way to generate correlated lists.
1 An example for lists with the pairwise value τ0 = −1/3: x1 = {3, 2, 1}, x2 = {2, 1, 3} and x3 = {1, 3, 2}.
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Fig. 8. The upper bound Mm as a function of τ0 for two different lengths of lists N . In both cases the upper bound Mm is the same over a large
part of the region τ0 < 0 and drops to 1 when τ0 → 1.
Fig. 9. The dependence of 〈τ 〉 on t for the proposed constructions of correlated lists.
Let us consider the lists of variables
xi,α = (1 − t) ai,α + t cα, (18a)
yα = (1 − t) bα + st cα + t2 (1 − s), (18b)
where ai,α , bα and cα are independent random variables uniformly distributed in the range [0; 1]. Here s = ±1
indicates correlation/anticorrelation between xi and y and t ∈ [0; 1] is the binding parameter controlling strength of
the correlation: t = 0 leads to uncorrelated lists, t = 1 to perfectly correlated (s = 1) or anticorrelated (s = −1) lists.
In all cases, values xi,α , yα lie in the range [0; 1].
For the lists deﬁned above, it can be shown that (see Appendix C)
〈τxy〉 = s 〈τxx 〉, 〈τxx 〉 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
u2
15
(
10 − 6u + u2
)
(u ≤ 1),
1
15
(
15 − 14
u
+ 4
u2
)
(u > 1),
(19)
where t/(1 − t) ≡ u. Plots of 〈τxx 〉 and 〈τxy〉 are shown in Fig. 9. Since buyers’ lists are prepared using the same
formula, the average value of their correlation is nonnegative. Notably, for any value of τ we can ﬁnd suitable s and t
that produce lists with the expected correlation equal to τ .
Lists created using Eq. (18) do not have ﬁxed mutual correlation, its actual value ﬂuctuates around the mean value
given by (19). According to the law of large numbers, f (τ ) is normally distributed. In Appendix B it is shown that
the variance of τ is proportional to 1/N . Such ﬂuctuations are negligible for long lists. We can conclude that Eq. (18)
present a way to create a system with the desired amount of correlation τ for any τ , M and N  1. Yet there is a hitch
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in the proposed construction of correlated lists. The parameter t inﬂuences the distribution of costs: for t = 0 or t = 1
they are distributed uniformly, for t = 0.5 the distribution f (x) has a tent shape. This is an implausible property:
the changes of the cost distributions can drive or distract the phenomena we are interested in. To ﬁx this problem we
propose the following two solutions.
First, to obtain correlated lists we can use the formulae
xi,α = 12 + st
(
α − 1
N − 1 −
1
2
)
+ (1 − t)
(
si,α − 12
)
, yα = α − 1N − 1 , (20)
where sα, j is a random quantity distributed uniformly in the range [0; 1]. The complicated form of xi,α has a simple
meaning. The vendor’s costs grow uniformly with α and buyers’ costs are connected to the vendor’s by the parameter
t ∈ [0; 1]. The term proportional to 1 − t introduces a noise to the system, resulting in differences between buyers’
and vendor’s lists. Finally, the term 1/2 represents the average value of buyers’ costs. It is easy to check that xi,α given
by (20) is conﬁned to the range [0; 1] for every t ∈ [0; 1] and s = ±1. The overall distribution of costs is uniform in
the range [0; 1] and thus we avoid the problems of Eq. (18). Moreover, this construction is simple enough to tract the
proposed model analytically.
Using the techniques shown in Appendix B we can ﬁnd Kendall’s tau in this case. In the limit N → ∞ one obtains
〈τxy〉 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
s
6
(
4u − u2
)
(u ≤ 1),
s
6
(
6 − 4
u
+ 1
u2
)
(u > 1),
(21a)
〈τxx 〉 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
u2
15
(
10 − 6u + u2
)
(u ≤ 1),
1
15
(
15 − 14
u
+ 4
u2
)
(u > 1),
(21b)
where again u ≡ t/(1 − t). The form of 〈τxx 〉 is identical with (19) found before for a different construction of
correlated lists.
As we will see later, Eq. (20) is not appropriate to produce anticorrelated lists. Hence we present one more approach
here—less accessible to analytical computation but more robust. The normal distribution is stable with respect to
addition of random variables and this motivates us to make the following choice
xi,α =
√
1 − t ai,α +
√
t cα, (22a)
yα =
√
1 − t bα + s
√
t cα (22b)
where ai,α, bα, cα are drawn from the standard normal distribution. It can be shown2 that in this case
〈τxx 〉 = 2
π
arcsin t, 〈τxy〉 = s 〈τxx 〉. (23)
The course of 〈τxx 〉 is shown in Fig. 9. As our market model assumes costs conﬁned to the range [0; 1], the costs given
by (22) have to be transformed using the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution Φ(x). In
this way we obtain
xˆi,α = Φ−1(xi,α), yˆα = Φ−1(yα). (24)
Since this transformation is monotonic, it does not affect the value of 〈τ 〉 and we can use Eq. (23) for transformed
lists of costs.
2 In the derivation, the following formula is useful∫ ∞
0
e−px2Erf(ax)Erf(bx) dx = 1√
πp
arctan
[
ab/
√
p(a2 + b2 + p)
]
.
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5. A market with correlations
When we discussed the market without correlations, the probability distribution of the variant cost πα(xi,α) was
independent of α. Consequently, the probability of accepting variant α
PA(α) =
∫
D
πα(xi,α) f (xi,α)dxi,α (25)
was also independent of α (we labeled PA ≡ p). As a result, when we change the acceptance function f (x) while
preserving the quantity
∫ 1
0 π(x) f (x)dx , the derived results remain unchanged. In the presence of correlations we
witness a very different picture: the detailed shape of the acceptance function f (x) is important. To keep the algebra
as simple as possible, from now on we adopt the simplest choice for f (x): the step function f (x) = 1 − Θ(x − p).
This means that a buyer accepts a proposed variant only when its cost is smaller than p.
In the following we ﬁrst deal with the market where costs are given by Eq. (20) for it is more accessible to analytical
treatment. Then we shortly present analytical results for the market where to introduce correlations, Eq. (22) is used.
5.1. An uninformed vendor in a market with correlations
Here we assume cost correlations created using Eq. (20). When the vendor has no information about the preferences
of buyers, similarly to Section 3.1 the best strategy is to produce vendor’s most favorable variants. First we focus on
the case of positive correlations; in (20) we set s = 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Using (25) and the chosen step acceptance
function f (x), the probability that one buyer accepts variant α is
PA(α) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 1 + (N − 1) p
t
< α,
1
1 − t
[
p − t α − 1
N − 1
]
1 + (N − 1) p + t − 1
t
< α < 1 + (N − 1) p
t
,
1 α < 1 + (N − 1) p + t − 1
t
.
(26)
Since we expect the total number of variants N to be very large and p rather small, the second region makes the major
contribution and thus we simplify Eq. (26) to PA(α) ≈ (p − tα/n)/(1 − t).
We assume that the vendor is simultaneously offering his k most favorable variants. The probability that one buyer
denies all offered variants is
PD(k) =
k∏
α=1
[1 − PA(α)] =
k∏
α=1
(
1 − p
1 − t
)(
1 + tα
N (1 − t + p)
)
. (27)
Since N is big, we use the approximation 1 − x ≈ exp[−x] to evaluate this expression analytically, leading to
PD(k) ≈
(
1 − p
1 − t
)k k∏
α=1
exp
[
− tα
N (1 − t + p)
]
≈ exp
[
− pk
1 − t +
tk2
2N (1 − t + p)
]
. (28)
Here we used also 1 − p/(1 − t) ≈ exp[−p/(1 − t)] which is valid when p/(1 − t) is small. When this is not the
case, the denying probability PD(k) approaches zero and thus the accepting probability is virtually one regardless to
the approximation used.
With respect to (20), the sum of the vendor’s expected costs can be written as
kZ +
k∑
α=1
MPS(α)
α − 1
N − 1 ≈ kZ +
k∑
α=1
MPS(α)
α
N
. (29)
Here the ﬁrst term represents ﬁxed costs for producing k different variants, PS(α) is the probability that to one buyer
variant α is sold. Since the probability that of the successful trade is 1 − PD(k), from the condition ∑kα=1 PS(α) =
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Fig. 10. The optimal number of variants to produce (left) and the optimal proﬁt drawn against st for two different values of the initial cost Z . Lines
show the analytical results derived above, symbols represent numerical simulations (averages of 1000 realizations), model parameters are set to
N = 2000, M = 500, p = 0.05. The decay of both quantities for st < 0 is in agreement with Eq. (31).
1 − PD(k) we can deduce
PS(α) = PA(α)k∑
α=1
PA(α)
[1 − PD(k)] . (30)
This corresponds to the portioning of the probability 1 − PD(k) among k variants according to their probability of
acceptance.
Now we can use (28)–(30) to write down the expected proﬁt of the vendor offering his k topmost variants X(k).
It is not possible to carry out the maximization of this expression analytically—numerical techniques have to be used
to ﬁnd kopt and Xopt. Results are shown in Fig. 10 as lines together with outcomes from a numerical simulation of
the model; a good agreement is found for st > 0. Results conﬁrm that positive correlations between buyers and the
vendor increase the vendor’s proﬁt. This pattern is most obvious in the case t = 1 when the vendor can offer only the
most favorable variant and still every buyer buys it.
In the numerical results shown in Fig. 10 we can notice one striking feature. When st < 0, kopt changes rapidly and
Xopt falls to zero quickly. Such a behavior is rather surprising for one does not expect abrupt changes in the region
st < 0 when there were none in the opposite region st > 0. The reason for this behavior is simple—when s = −1,
vendor’s most preferred variants have costs too high to be accepted by buyers. This effect can be quantiﬁed. When
buyers’ costs are generated by (20), the inequality xi,α ≥ t (N−α)/(N−1) holds. Due to the acceptance function only
the variants with cost smaller than p are accepted. Therefore only variants with α ≥ αmin can be possibly accepted,
where
αmin = 1 + (N − 1) t − pt ≈ N (1 − p/t). (31)
Thus with negative correlations in the market, the vendor is able to sell the most favorable variant (the one with α = 1)
only if p ≥ t . When p < t , the vendor sells no variants α = 1, . . . , αmin −1. Since αmin grows steeply with t (already
with t = 2p one obtain αmin = N/2), the vendor offering his top k variants has to offer too many of them and he
suffers both big initial costs and big costs yα . As a result, the vendor is pushed out of the market.
Without detailed investigation we can infer the system behavior when the step acceptance function is replaced by
a different choice. In the limit of careless buyers with f (x) = C , the inﬂuence of correlations vanishes and both kopt
and Xopt do not depend on st and the model simpliﬁes to the case investigated in Section 3.1. Thus as f (x) gradually
changes from the step function to a constant function, the dependence on st gets weaker. In particular, if the largest
cost x for which f (x) > 0 is x0 (for the step function x0 = p), in Eq. (31) p is replaced by x0. As a consequence,
αmin = decreases and the steep decline of Xopt in Fig. 10 shifts to a lower value of st .
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Fig. 11. The optimal number of variants and the optimal proﬁt of the uninformed vendor in the market with correlations given by (22) and (24).
Numerical results are averages of 1000 repetitions, p = 0.05, N = 2000, M = 500.
Fig. 12. The layout of the introduced trading model. Each column represents a sorted list of variants’ costs (the most preferred at top). The vendor
is willing to go down his list by d, in consequence buyers are forced to go down by some value b. Question marks signalize that after sorting of all
lists we do not know standing of variants in the lists.
5.2. An uninformed vendor in a different market with correlations
Now we switch to the market costs drawn using Eq. (22) and transformed to the range [0; 1] by Eq. (24). As
we have already mentioned, this case is not allowable for an analytical treatment—hence we present only numerical
results in Fig. 11. They agree with our expectations: when st = 1, for the vendor it is sufﬁcient to produce only one
variant. As the positive correlations diminish, the optimal number of offered variants grows and the proﬁt shrinks.
A closer investigation of the vendor’s behavior in this case exceeds the scope of this paper and remains as a future
challenge.
6. Another trading model
In previous sections we presented a way how to deal with the trading process. Here we shortly present a different
model which arises from the same playground as our previous reasonings but highlight slightly different aspects of
the market phenomenon.
Let us have a market with M buyers and N different variants that the vendor can produce. Preferences of the
interested parties are again represented by the scalar costs xi,α , yα (i = 1, . . . , M , α = 1, . . . , N ) uniformly
distributed in the range [0; 1] (thus again we have no correlations in the system).
In a market, a vendor is aware that when some buyer is not satisﬁed with the offer, she can choose a different
vendor. Therefore every vendor tries to induce as small cost as possible to the customers. This can be done by
offering of the variants highly preferred by many buyers. We can visualize the process by sorting preference lists of all
interested parties. Now when some variant is near the top of a buyer’s list, its cost is small and it is favorable for this
buyer.
We have to specify the criterion for the “variant preferred by many buyers”. First, it can be the variant that is not
too deep in nobody’s list. Thus, if we label the position of variant α in the list of buyer i as ki,α and maxi ki,α as bα , the
vendor chooses the variant α that has the smallest bα . The selection process is visualized in Fig. 12. Now the question
is: how far buyers have to go down their lists? In other words: if we label b ≡ minα bα , what is 〈b〉?
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Fig. 13. Numerical and analytical results for 〈x〉 plotted against d for various values of M (N = 1000, numerical results are averages of 1000
repetitions). The analytical result for 〈y〉 is shown by the broken line.
Since we have M buyers in the market, the probability of a particular value b is approximately given by the formula
P(b) ≈
[
1 −
(
b − 1
N
)M]d
×
[
M
d
N
(
b
N
)M−1]
. (32)
Here the ﬁrst term denotes the probability that there is no such a variant which is among topmost b−1 for every buyer
and among topmost d for the vendor.3 The second term responds to the fact that there is some variant which is exactly
on bth place in the list of a buyer (we do not care who it is, thus the multiplication by M appears), among b topmost
variants in lists of other buyers and among d topmost variants in the vendor’s list.
In Eq. (32) we can use the approximation (1 − x)s ≈ exp[−xd] which is valid when x  1. To calculate
〈b〉 = ∑Nb=1 bP(b) we replace the summation by the integration in the range [0;∞] which yields
〈b〉 ≈ NΓ (1/M)
M
d−1/M . (33)
Here we dropped terms vanishing in the limit N → ∞ (for there is a big number of variants that the vendor can
produce).
Since there are no correlations in the system, when the vendor offers his d topmost variants, every variant has the
same probability to be chosen by a buyer. Thus the vendor has to go down his list on average by (1+d)/2. On average
this corresponds to the cost
〈y〉 = 1 + d
2N
. (34)
With the probability 1/M , a particular buyer has the sold variant on the bth place of his list. With the complementary
probability 1 − 1/M he has this variant somewhere between the 1st and bth place. Thus we have
〈x〉 = 1
N
(
1
M
〈b〉 + M − 1
M
1 + 〈b〉
2
)
≈ (M + 1)Γ (1/M)
2M2
d−1/M . (35)
When the number of buyers M is large, this approaches 12 d
−1/M . A comparison of results (34) and (35) with numerical
simulations is shown in Fig. 13; a good agreement is found. A small discrepancy for M = 1 can be corrected using
the result 〈y〉 ≈ 1/(d + 1) which we develop in the following section.
To discover the scaling behavior of 〈b〉, one can follow a shorter path. The probability that one particular offered
variant is among topmost b in one buyer’s list is b/N . For all buyers simultaneously the probability is (b/N )M . Since
the vendor offers d items, the probability that at least one of them is above the line is approximately d(b/N )M . If this
3 Since in one list each variant appears only once, this is only an approximate form of the probability.
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equal to O(1), the trading is successful. Thus we obtain 〈b〉 = NO(1) d−1/M . This result scales with M and d in the
same way as the previous outcome of the detailed derivation.
At the end we have to mention that this model of transactions between the vendor and buyers is not relevant for a
high number of buyers because 〈x〉 decreases very slowly in this case. In other words: when M is high, the probability
that there is a variant which is not worst in any buyer list approaches zero.
6.1. A vendor producing more than one variant
From the previous discussion we know that in a big market vendor cannot insist on selling only one variant.
Therefore we would like to investigate a more relaxed case where the vendor offers simultaneously d different variants.
Then every buyer can choose the most suitable one for him or her. We would like to investigate, how much the buyers
suffer in this case. To do so, we label the most favorable variant from the vendor’s offer for one particular buyer b and
compute the average value of this quantity.
The probability that one particular value b occurs is
P(b) = d
N − b + 1
b−1∏
j=1
(
1 − d
N − j + 1
)
. (36)
In this formula the product represents the probability that all d variants offered by the vendor are in the buyer’s list
lower than b − 1, the ﬁrst term represents the probability that one of the offered variants is on bth place in the buyer’s
list. Now we can derive 〈b〉
〈b〉 =
N∑
b=0
bP(b) = N + 1
d + 1 − d
(
N
d
)−1
≈ N + 1
d + 1 . (37)
Consequently, the average cost suffered by a buyer is given by 〈x〉 = 〈b〉/N ≈ 1/(d + 1). We see that M does not
appear in 〈x〉. This means that the problem with the improper behavior of the model in big markets do not appear
in this variation. Since in the calculation we did not make any approximations, no numerical simulation is needed to
check the result.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to explore the modeling of a market with heterogeneous buyers and a vendor producing
multiple variants. We see that the outcomes depend on whether one or both sides have adequate information about the
other side or not. In standard microeconomics, Pigou [12] has introduced the concept of price or demand elasticity.
Vendors, knowing the buyers’ reserve prices to pay and thus pricing individually, can reap signiﬁcant proﬁt—this
is usually called the ﬁrst-degree price differentiation. Our analysis can be considered as a generalization in this
direction. We show that if individual tastes are taken into account, there is much complexity in the system; treating
individual tastes with a large number of buyers presents a considerable mathematical challenge. Our models point out
a convenient way to tackle this type of problems and we expect that many real economy-motivated problems can be
analyzed in a similar way. Vendors and buyers have many ways to improve their welfare.
In this study we have proposed two simple market models. While accessible to analytical solutions, they exhibit
many features of real markets. In particular, diversiﬁcation of the vendor’s production and market competition are
used as examples. The diversiﬁcation is presented as an interplay between the vendor’s pursuit to follow the buyers’
tastes and the costs growing with the number of produced variants. We also show that in a market with many buyers
without preferences correlations, the knowledge of these preferences does not increase the vendor’s proﬁt. When the
correlations are introduced to the system, many technical complications arise. Nevertheless, the results are consistent
with the expectations: a positive correlation between the buyers’ and vendor’s costs improves the vendor’s proﬁt. Also,
when the interests of the two parties diverge (the correlation are negative), the vendor is able to make only a small
or even no proﬁt. In addition, in Section 6 a similarly aimed model based on the well-known matching problem is
investigated.
As many other directions can be explored further, we do not consider this topic exhausted. First of all, in a correlated
market the vendor strategies and the inﬂuence of information deserve attention. Furthermore, while in the present work
we investigated the inﬂuence of tastes on the market, the product quality and price were excluded from the analysis.
16
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
Fig. A.1. An illustration of the proof. The ﬁrst case (ﬁrst three lines) has the biggest possible value of Pyz , the second case has the smallest possible
value of Pyz .
Eventually, the framework established herein can be used to raise the law of supply and demand from a microscopical
point of view.
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Appendix A. Proof of τ -inequality
Let us have three lists x, y, z consisting of N mutually different real numbers. Kendall’s τ for lists x and y can be
written as τxy = (Pxy − Nxy)/T where Pxy is the number of pairs α < β that satisfy (xα − xβ)(yα − yβ) > 0, Nxy
is the same with a negative result of the product, and T = N (N − 1)/2 is the total number of different pairs α, β. For
the given values τxy and N it follows that
Pxy = T (1 + τxy)/2, Nxy = T (1 − τxy)/2. (A.1)
We would like to ﬁnd bounds for τyz when τxy and τxz are given. First we reorder lists x, y, z so that lists x is
sorted in the descending order and for α < β it is xα − xβ > 0. Such a rearrangement does not affect the values of
Pxy, Pxz, Pyz, Nxy, Nxz, Nyz and thus the values of Kendall’s tau between lists remain also unchanged.
Since now all differences xα − xβ are positive, from τxy we can deduce that there are Pxy positive differences
yα − yβ and Nxy negative differences. Similarly, Pxz differences zα − zβ are positive and Nxz are negative. The values
of Pyz and Nyz depend on the relative ordering of lists y and z. The biggest possible value of Pyz occurs when positive
differences yα − yβ are aligned with positive differences zα − zβ (see Fig. A.1). By contrast, the smallest value of Pyz
(and thus the smallest value of τyz) occurs when positive differences yα − yβ are aligned with negative differences
zα − zβ .
From Fig. A.1 we see that Pyz and Nyz fulﬁll the inequalities
Nyz ≥ |Pxy − Nxz |, Pyz ≥ |Pxy − Pxz |.
Using Pab + Nab = T and (A.1) we obtain
T
2
|τxy − τyz | ≤ Pyz ≤ T − T2 |τxy + τyz |,
−T + T
2
|τxy − τyz | ≤ −Myz ≤ −T2 |τxy + τyz |.
These two inequalities summed together and divided by T yield the desired inequality (16).
Appendix B. System’s upper bound with a given τ0
To obtain the upper limit Mm for the number of lists that have pairwise Kendall’s tau equal to τ0 we use a
constructive way of reasoning. Without loss of generality we assume that in the ﬁrst list all N (N − 1)/2 ≡ T
17
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
Fig. B.1. Construction of the set of lists with the given value of Kendall’s tau for T = 10 (thus N = 5) and W = 4 (thus τ0 = 0.2).
differences xα − xβ (α < β) are positive. From Eq. (A.1) it follows that to maintain τ12 = τ0, in the second list
exactly N2 = (1 − τ0)T/2 pairs have to be negative. The same holds for all other lists which we would like to add to
the system, Ni = (1 − τ0)T/2 ≡ W is required for i ≥ 2 (N1 = 0 is ﬁxed by the chosen ordering of the ﬁrst list).
To represent the way of construction we use Fig. B.1. The ﬁrst list is represented by T positive pairs there, second
one by T − N2 positive pairs and by N2 negative pairs. We would like to ﬁnd a third list satisfying τ13 = τ23 = τ0.
We already know that N3 = W negative pairs have to be accommodated there. To achieve τ23 = τ0 it is necessary
that exactly half of the negative pairs in the second list meets with negative pairs in the third list. This can be fulﬁlled
in two ways (lines 3 and 4 in Fig. B.1) which also have mutually τ34 = τ0.
Now there are two important points to notice. First, the construction of the third and the fourth list is impossible
when N3 is an odd number. Thus for corresponding values of τ0 there are not more than two lists that have mutually
Kendall’s tau equal to this τ0. Second, we have used purely combinatorial arguments here without taking care whether
described set of lists (e.g. lists 1, 2, 3 and 4 from Fig. B.1) do exist. Thus we estimate an upper bound which cannot
be exceeded but which can dwarf the real maximum by far.
Now we can continue with the ﬁfth list where again N5 = W negative pairs are present. Among them exactly N5/2
have to meet with negative pairs in the second list and also half of them have to meet with negative pairs in the third
and fourth list. This can be achieved by lists 5 and 6 in Fig. B.1, their relative Kendall’s tau is also τ0.
During the construction process we divide W negative pairs present in the second lists into two groups with size
W/2 (lists 3 and 4), then we divide again and obtain lists 5 and 6 with groups of negative pairs with size W/4. Clearly,
this sequence ends when we divide the original number of negative pairs W so many times that we arrive at 1 which
cannot be divided further. Consequently, the upper bound we are looking for is the following
Mm ≈ 2 + 2 log2 w = 2 + 2 log2
(1 − τ0)(N − 1)N
4
. (B.1)
This formula holds when τ0 < 1 (for τ0 = 1, clearly Mm = 1).
In the previous construction, there is one hidden ﬂaw. Since only W/2 negative pairs in the third list meet negative
pairs in second list, to prepare lists 1, 2 and 3 we use altogether W + W/2 pairs. If this number is greater than T ,
the third list cannot be constructed in the described way and the limiting Mm differs from the previously found result.
To construct lists 5 and 6 we need together W + W/2 + W/4 pairs which has to be smaller than T . By generalizing
previous argument we can write down the inequality for the maximum number of lists Mm
W + W/2 + · · · + W/2Mm/2−1 ≤ T .
For Mm itself it follows that
Mm ≤ 2 log2
1 − τ0
−τ0 . (B.2)
This limit is relevant only for τ0 < 0 (with τ0 > 0 we have W < T/2 and W +W/2+· · · is less than T ). As an actual
upper bound, the smaller value from (B.1) and (B.2) applies.
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Appendix C. Expected values of 〈τ〉
For lists created using (18) we can rearrange (15) as follows
〈τxx 〉 = 2N (N − 1)
∑
α<β
〈σαβ〉 = 〈σαβ〉.
Moreover, σαβ can be rewritten as
〈σαβ〉 = P++ + P−− − P−+ − P+− = 1 − 2P−+ − 2P+− = 1 − 4P+−.
Here P++ is the probability that both xα − xβ and x ′α − x ′β are positive and so forth, the formulae P+− = P−+,
P++ + P−− + P−+ + P+− = 1 are used. According to (18) we write
xα − xβ = (1 − t)(aα − aβ) + t (cα − cβ) ≡ (1 − t)A + tC,
x ′α − x ′β = (1 − t)(bα − bβ) + t (cα − cβ) ≡ (1 − t)B + tC,
where A, B,C lie in the range [−1; 1] and are equally distributed with the density 	(A) = 1 − |A|. Now we have
(t/(1 − t) ≡ u)
P(+ − |C) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2
(uC)2
[
1 − 1
2
(uC)2
]
(C ≤ 1/u),
0 (C > 1/u).
If u ≤ 1, the ﬁrst case applies to all possible values of C , P(+ − |C) = 0 is possible only if u > 1. Finally, using
P(+−) =
∫ 1
−1
P(+ − |C)	(C) dC
with 	(C) = 1 − |C | it follows that
〈τxx 〉 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
u2
15
(
10 − 6u + u2
)
(u ≤ 1),
1
15
(
15 − 14
u
+ 4
u2
)
(u > 1).
The quantity 〈τxy〉 can be derived in the same way.
The variance of τxx can be found by a direct computation of 〈τ 2xx 〉. We have
τ 2xx =
1
N 2(N − 1)2
(∑
α =β
σ 2αβ +
∑
α =β
∑
γ =δ
σαβσγ δ
)
.
The averaging procedure is straightforward. At the end we obtain
σ 2τ = 〈τ 2xx 〉 − 〈τxx 〉2 ≈
4
N
(
〈σαγ σγβ〉 − 〈σαβ〉2
)
,
where the terms proportional to higher powers of 1/N were neglected. The variance is largest when t = 0, for t = ±1
obviously στ = 0.
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